Site icon Indigenous Russia

Indigenous peoples’ issues as a tool for Russia’s international publicity in the Arctic region

Indigenous Russia

Pavel Sulyandziga, PhD in Economics, President of the International Indigenous Fund for Development and Solidarity “Batani”, First Vice-President of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (RAIPON) from 1998 to 2010. 

Dmitry Berezhkov, student at the Arctic University of Norway (UiT), editor of the Indigenous Russia website, Vice President of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (RAIPON) from 2004 to 2013. 

Recommended Citation

Pavel Sulyandziga & Dmitry Berezhkov, Indigenous Peoples as a Tool for Russia’s International Publicity in the Arctic Region, 29 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 285 (2024). Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol29/iss2/7

Introduction

“The Arctic region holds strategic significance on a global scale, with the Russian Federation placing a high priority on it for the purposes of national security and development. The President’s decree[1] outlines ambitious objectives for the Arctic territories of Russia, emphasizing the enhancement of living standards for the 2.5 million inhabitants of the region. Key initiatives include stimulating economic growth, as well as transforming the Northern Sea Route into a major international transportation corridor. To achieve these aims, it is imperative to expedite the development process of the Arctic territories, adhering to the President’s directive to strengthen Russia’s presence and role in this critically important region.”[2]

Spanning approximately 9 million square kilometers, the Russian Arctic is home to about 2.5 million people, representing a mere 1.5% of the national population. Despite its sparse population, this region is a powerhouse of economic activity, contributing to 10% of Russia’s GDP and 20% of its exports. The Arctic is a rich source of natural resources, accounting for 80% of Russia’s natural gas production, 17% of oil, 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper, and virtually all the diamonds, rare, and rare earth metals mined within the country[3].

These statements underscore the significance Moscow places on Arctic policy, highlighting the region’s pivotal role in the nation’s economy and strategic objectives. Some analysts in Russia draw parallels between the Arctic’s developmental impact and monumental Soviet projects in nuclear arms and space exploration[4], illustrating the immense potential and importance attributed to the Arctic region.

The demarcation of the Russian Arctic’s boundaries[5] was determined through administrative and political decisions rather than based on the actual physical and geographical characteristics of the region. This decision-making process does not accurately reflect the diverse natural landscapes and climatic conditions across the Arctic. For instance, some areas in central Yakutia, which are not officially part of the Russian Arctic, experience harsher climates than those in the northern districts. Consequently, the Russian Arctic encompasses a broader spectrum of territories than those officially recognized within the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.

Recognizing the Arctic’s enhanced value to Russia’s economy and budget was a key factor behind significant administrative reforms. This led to the establishment of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East in 2012, which was later renamed in 2019 to include the Arctic, aiming to improve public administration efficiency in the development of the Russian Arctic[6].

The Russian Arctic and Siberia form a substantial part of the Russian Federation’s territory, a fact that instills immense national pride among Russians for residing in the world’s largest country. These regions are crucial for the support of the Russian economy and its population, contributing to over half of the national budget revenues. Despite this, the population density in these vast territories is significantly lower compared to the European part of Russia. These areas are home to several dozen ethnic groups identified under Russian law as the “indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation.”

This introduction deliberately avoids delving deeply into the uniqueness of the term “indigenous peoples” within the Russian context, which restricts the population of these groups to 50,000[7]—a definition not recognized in international practice. Instead, it’s crucial to highlight that these territories have been central to the colonial empire Russia has built over centuries through the efforts of conquerors like Ermak, Khabarov, Atlasov, among others. This empire has been experiencing a gradual decline since 1917.

The terminology used to describe Russian expansion into these areas, such as “conquest” or “colonization,” has been contested by Russian and Soviet historians for generations. They argue that the process was less severe than the Western colonization of the New World, opting instead for terms like “development” and referring to the leaders of Cossack expeditions as “pioneers,” with the acquisition of new territories labeled as “annexation.”

Despite scholarly debates, it is undeniable that the Cossacks’ expansion into Siberia, often romanticized as “meeting the sun”[8], was marked by persistent armed conflicts with the indigenous tribes they encountered. The narrative of colonization universally involves force and violence, except perhaps in the rare case of settling uninhabited islands. While it’s recognized that resistance was not one-sided, with Siberian peoples mounting fierce opposition and revolts against both the Russian Empire [9] and later, the Soviet regime[10], the Russian state’s military prowess, especially its advanced weaponry, overwhelmingly surpassed the indigenous populations’ ability to resist.

Beyond the use of sheer force, Russian conquerors employed subtler strategies to secure and govern new territories. These included trade exchanges, famously epitomized by the “beads for gold” transactions, educational initiatives, religious missions[11], and the establishment of distinct legal frameworks[12]. A particularly effective tactic was enlisting the cooperation of indigenous intermediaries to achieve colonization objectives, mirroring practices seen in other colonial contexts.

This approach recalls how Hernan Cortez, with a modest force of just a few hundred soldiers of Spanish infantry, managed to besiege Tenochtitlan, the Aztec empire’s capital, with an army primarily composed of local tribe members, largely thanks to the critical role played by Malinche, a local woman who served as his interpreter and advisor[13]. Similarly, in Siberia, Cossacks leveraged internal conflicts, such as those between Khans Kuchum and Yediger[14], to their advantage, and similarly enlisted local groups like the Kamchadals (Itelmens) in Alaska’s colonization[15].

Often, the leaders of the subdued tribes engaged with colonizers, motivated either by the allure of novel riches (the proverbial beads) or the promise of support in their local power struggles. 

However, as we can see from the history of colonization of the New World and other foreign territories, despite the immediate gains for some individuals, these arrangements invariably disadvantaged the indigenous populations, leading to the loss of their lands, independence, and, in many cases, their way of life. 

The primary aim of these colonial endeavors was the extraction of resources, whether it was land, gold, or, later, oil and gas. 

The legend of “The Good News” was another major technology used by the vanquishers to conquer indigenous lands. At first, it was the Gospel, which the Church and the State used to explain to the conquered tribes that the loss of freedom is an accession to God, which, in turn, is good for them. In addition to the political effect, this legend had a self-therapeutic result. Through it, conquistadors and European monarchs assured themselves and each other that the horrors of colonization were good because they brought the light of God to barbarians. 

In the Soviet Union, this phenomenon transformed into the inclusion of “Small Nationalities of the North” into the people’s socialism building and later into the enduring myth of ‘peaceful annexation’ of Siberia. Regrettably, Russian authorities still exploit this narrative today. Today, they use this narrative in the Arctic region to show their supposed care for the indigenous peoples. The Russian state continues to employ strategies that exploit and manage formerly colonized peoples, reminiscent of the historical use of “mankurts”[16], or individuals turned against their own for the colonizer’s benefit.

Russia and the Arctic Council 

For many officials in Moscow, the Arctic has traditionally been perceived as a remote and largely abstract area. Historically, the Russian state dispatched expeditions to the Arctic, Siberia, and as far as the Pacific Ocean mainly to tap into the wealth of resources these regions had to offer, which were scarce in the European part of Russia. Initially, the pursuit was for furs, but over time, the focus shifted towards the extraction of oil, gas, and diamonds in Siberia (including the Arctic regions), thereby establishing these territories as critical to the country’s resource base.

To boost resource extraction efforts, the Soviet Union initiated a system of monetary benefits and compensations in the 1930s for workers willing to relocate to the “regions of the Far North.” This system allowed for salaries that were two to three times higher than the national average, serving as a significant enticement for individuals to venture beyond the Arctic Circle for employment opportunities[17], which not only facilitated the development of a robust industry in these northern reaches but also led to a significant population increase in the region. The demographic growth in Russia’s Arctic territories outpaced that of Arctic regions in other countries by a considerable margin, illustrating the effectiveness of the Soviet Union’s policies in attracting and retaining a workforce in these remote areas.[18]

During World War II, the Arctic’s significance as a transport artery became apparent, particularly when it became a primary route for lend-lease supplies. The strategic importance of the Arctic continued to evolve during the Cold War. With the development of the nuclear fleet and missile weapons, and considering that the shortest air and space routes between Eurasia and North America pass through the Arctic[19], Moscow acknowledged the region as a critical zone for its military presence.

In 1987, the Arctic unexpectedly became the focal point of a significant shift in the USSR’s foreign policy. That autumn, Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, visited Murmansk. The occasion for his visit was to bestow the title of “Hero City” upon Murmansk, marking a pivotal moment in the country’s engagement with the Arctic region.[20]

In his speech during the event in Murmansk, which marked a significant turn in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the CPSU[21], proposed six initiatives that would later be referred to as the Murmansk initiatives. These included: 

1. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northern Europe.

2. The restriction of naval activities in the seas adjacent to this area.

3. The organization of peaceful cooperation for the rational development of the North’s resources.

4. The promotion of scientific research of the Arctic.

5. Taking measures to protect the environment in the Arctic region.

6. Depending on the normalization of international relations, opening the Northern Sea Route for the passage of foreign ships under Soviet icebreaking services, with the rights of entry into Soviet ports[22].

The Murmansk initiatives underscored a pivotal move toward cooperation and transparency in Arctic affairs, focusing on peaceful development, environmental conservation, and cross-border scientific endeavors. This strategic pivot not only played a crucial role in easing tensions between the USSR and Western countries but also laid the groundwork for international collaboration in the Arctic region. The initiatives directly contributed to the formulation of a unified strategy for Arctic environmental protection in 1991. Subsequently, these collaborative efforts culminated in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996. The signing of this declaration signaled the official commencement of the Arctic Council’s activities.[23]

Right from the outset, upon the insistence of international partners, indigenous peoples’ organizations were integral to Arctic international cooperation. The Circumpolar Inuit Council (ICC), the Sami Council, and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) were included as Permanent Participants in 1991. This inclusion marked a significant step towards ensuring that the voices and perspectives of indigenous communities were heard and considered in discussions about the Arctic region.

Following the signing of the Ottawa Declaration and the establishment of the Arctic Council as a fully-fledged international regional organization, these indigenous peoples’ organizations gained a unique international status. This status empowered them to actively engage in negotiations and the decision-making processes concerning the Arctic within the framework of the Arctic Council.[24]

Given that the Arctic Council adopts its decisions through consensus, and that Permanent Participants, including indigenous peoples’ organizations, have the voice on par with member States, the Council has successfully established a model of cooperation that embodies respect for and inclusion of indigenous peoples’ perspectives. This approach to decision-making, predicated on obtaining prior consent, aligns with the highest international legal standards, such as those outlined in the ILO Convention 169 “On Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries”[25] or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples[26]. It might be challenging to identify another international organization that incorporates indigenous peoples’ organizations into its decision-making process as extensively as the Arctic Council does. This inclusivity represents a significant accomplishment attributable not only to the policies of Russia at the time but also to the collective efforts of other Arctic states. 

Initially, the Arctic Council was not regarded by the Kremlin as a pivotal international forum. Russia was navigating the complexities of transitioning to a market economy and establishing a new political framework, and the Council’s role and activities were relatively unknown to many officials in Moscow. During this period, criticism from RAIPON regarding Russian policies towards indigenous peoples within the Arctic Council, as well as in other international venues, was not uncommon.[27] The Arctic Council has served as a significant learning platform for both indigenous communities and state representatives, fostering collaboration on sustainable development, environmental protection, and the implementation of major environmental initiatives. 

This dynamic started to evolve notably during Russia’s initial chairmanship of the Arctic Council between 2004 and 2006, which coincided with the International Polar Year of 2007-2008. It was a period that underscored Russia’s increasing engagement and influence within the Council. 

Those days, the famous Russian explorer and popularizer of the Arctic, Artur Chilingarov, planted the Russian flag on the ocean floor near the North Pole,[28] which became an important propaganda symbol for Kremlin in its emerging, artificially constructed “Fight for the Arctic”.

Later Vitaly Churkin who was an Ambassador-at-Large for Russia’s participation in the Arctic Council and the Barents Council with support from his long-time colleague, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, received promotion as the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations and the UN Security Council (UNSC)[29].  Finally, the Arctic Council and the broader Arctic region garnered significant attention from the highest echelons of Russia’s leadership. 

Indigenous peoples in Russia’s Arctic Policy

In 2008, President Medvedev, succeeding Putin, endorsed the “Fundamentals of Russia’s State Policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond.” This pivotal document delineated the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (referred to as the Russian Arctic) as a distinct focus of state policy. It marked the beginning of a structured approach to developing strategic planning documents dedicated to the socio-economic advancement of the region and the bolstering of national security, underscoring the Arctic’s growing importance within Russia’s national policy framework.[30]

In the “Fundamentals of Russia’s State Policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond,” it is noteworthy that the indigenous peoples of the North are not included within the defined “national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.” Primarily, these interests focus on utilizing the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base to facilitate the socio-economic development of the country. Similarly, indigenous peoples are absent from the outlined “main goals of the state policy of the Russian Federation” in the Arctic, where the primary objective is the expansion of the region’s resource base to significantly satisfy Russia’s demands for hydrocarbon resources, aquatic biological resources, and other strategic raw materials.[31]

References to indigenous peoples are found in further sections that highlight the State’s commitment to “improving the quality of life of the indigenous population.” This aim is proposed to be achieved through measures such as “enhancing educational programs,” alongside the development of “environmentally safe types of tourism in areas of traditional residence and economic activities of indigenous small-numbered peoples.” Additionally, the preservation of “cultural heritage and languages, as well as folk art crafts,” is underscored.[32]

In its Arctic Policy, the state has delineated the role of indigenous peoples with a focus on education, tourism, culture, languages, and arts and crafts[33]. Meanwhile, the policy prioritizes the advancement of extractive industries, indicating a clear hierarchy in the state’s approach to the development of the Arctic region. 

It is noteworthy that in the documents concerning the Arctic that have been issued since 2008, there has been an increasing focus on outlining the state’s intentions regarding the indigenous peoples of the North[34]. This trend became particularly pronounced in the lead-up to Russia’s latest term as chair of the Arctic Council for 2021-2023, during which a significant number of such documents were produced. 

In the “Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period up to 2020,” signed by new (old) President Putin in 2013, there is a notable emphasis on enhancing living standards, advancing education, promoting ethnocultural development, and developing tourism. Importantly, the strategy acknowledges the “low quality of life” of the indigenous peoples of the North as a significant challenge to the socio-economic development of the Russian Arctic. Furthermore, President Putin highlighted the necessity of devising a “set of measures for the development of traditional economic sectors” aimed at bolstering employment and self-employment opportunities for indigenous peoples.[35]

In the “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2035,” signed by the President of the Russian Federation on March 5, 2020, the emphasis on “protection of the native habitat and traditional way of life of indigenous small peoples living in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” has been elevated to the status of a “national priority” in Russia’s Arctic policy. However, it’s worth noting that this priority is listed after other objectives deemed more critical, such as “ensuring sovereignty,” and the development of a “strategic resource base,” among other tasks. Furthermore, the document emphasizes the importance of ensuring that individuals “belonging to small-numbered peoples” have access to natural resources essential for maintaining a traditional lifestyle and conducting traditional economic activities.[36]

The inclusion of a provision for developing “mechanisms for the participation of persons belonging to small peoples and their authorized representatives in decision-making on the implementation of industrial activities in their traditional places of residence and traditional economic activities” represents a particularly progressive aspect of Russia’s Arctic policy.

However, it might be posited that the expanded attention given to the indigenous peoples of the North in Russian Arctic policy documents is less a reflection of a genuine increase in concern for the rights of these communities and more a strategic maneuver in anticipation of Russia’s next presidency of the Arctic Council (2021-2023). This interpretation is supported by the rapid adoption of a suite of “Arctic” documents in 2020-2021, focused in part on the socio-economic development of indigenous peoples, strategically timed just months before Russia took up the chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

In addition to the above-mentioned “Fundamentals of the State policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” (03/05/2020), the following were also adopted: 

Within the range of policy documents addressing Russia’s Arctic strategy, issues concerning the indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North are variously acknowledged and addressed. Notably, several of these documents focus specifically on the socio-economic development of these communities. A prime example is the “Standard of responsibility of residents of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in relations with indigenous small-numbered peoples,” a document that received significant promotion and was officially approved by the Ministry of Regional Development in 2020. [37]

This document sets forth principles aimed at “promoting” the sustainable development of indigenous peoples and the preservation of their ancestral habitats by resource-extraction companies operating in the Arctic (referred to as “residents” of the Russian Arctic). To a casual observer, the introduction of such principles might appear groundbreaking. 

In particular, it outlines the following “principles”:

While the document introduces principles that are innovative for Russian legislation, it faces criticism from the human rights community of indigenous peoples due to its lack of alignment with the practical realities in Russia. 

First of all, the guidelines for interaction between industrial companies and indigenous peoples are merely “recommended,” implying that their adoption is voluntary and not enforced. Additionally, the document’s issuance at a relatively low governmental level—an order from a federal ministry—highlights its limited influence within the broader legislative and administrative framework. In an environment where both business representatives and officials routinely disregard mandatory federal legislation, including laws related to ecology[38] and indigenous peoples’ rights[39], recommendations that rely on voluntary compliance are viewed as ineffective. This skepticism casts doubt on the document’s potential to effect meaningful change or promote the well-being of indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic.

It is true that mining companies have been engaging in agreements with authorities and, on occasion, with organizations representing indigenous peoples, particularly in regions like the Yamalo-Nenets or Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrugs[40], as well as in Yakutia where ethnological examinations are conducted[41] . However, it’s important to recognize that such activities were initiated prior to the introduction of the federal “Standard.” For instance, Yakutia’s law “On Ethnological Expertise” was enacted in 2010[42], and agreements between oil companies and indigenous communities in the Khanty-Mansiysk district have been in place for several decades.

Recently, one of the authors of this article took part in an online session titled “Industrial development in the territories of traditional nature management: features and problems.” This session was part of the “II Forum of Territories of Traditional Nature Management of Indigenous Small Peoples of the North of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)” known as “BALDYDYAK.”[43]

The session left a profound impression due to the apparent reluctance among participants—encompassing government officials, indigenous peoples’ representatives, and experts—to reference international law norms and the global experience in addressing indigenous peoples’ issues, a stark contrast to the dialogue prior to the escalation of conflict in Ukraine on February 22, 2022. This avoidance of legal frameworks often led discussions to be driven by emotion rather than jurisprudence. A notable moment was when a participant, in the absence of legal arguments, resorted to moral reasoning, stating that industrial companies violating the rights of indigenous peoples in Yakutia “should be ashamed.”

The event also reviewed the application of ethnological expertise in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), notable for being the sole region in Russia where such expertise is both legislatively supported and practically applied. Discussions highlighted instances where mining companies, prompted by regional authorities, consented to undergo this assessment and engaged in agreements for the socio-economic development of indigenous communities. However, the discourse also acknowledged instances of refusal by companies to participate in such initiatives, citing the lack of federal mandate for such actions, pointing to disparities between regional practices and the federal legal framework, alongside sharing both positive and negative outcomes from these experiences.

Public representatives at the session consistently voiced concerns that regional authorities have limited influence over business practices due to the federal center’s control over exploration and production licenses. A vivid complaint highlighted the environmental repercussions of such policies: “There is not even clean drinking water in Iengra anymore, and Rosnedra has issued a license for a village cemetery,” lamented one participant, emphasizing the disconnect between local needs and federal actions. Further underscoring these challenges, Natalia Novikova, a distinguished anthropologist and Doctor of Historical Sciences at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, expressed her disillusionment with the “Standard of responsibility of residents of the Arctic zone…” and noted the cessation of its monitoring by the Ministry of Regional Development after the finishing of the Russian chairmanship in the Arctic Council.

The discussions revealed that in regions and among companies where there is effective collaboration between business and government, large mining entities tend to adhere to the Standard’s recommendations. Conversely, in the absence of such cooperation, neither authorities nor indigenous communities possess mechanisms to influence business practices, especially when companies disregard indigenous rights.

Drawing from years of involvement in the indigenous social movement, the authors of this article acknowledge that this scenario, where businesses operate with little regard for indigenous rights absent governmental or communal pressure, predates the introduction of the Standard.

Olga Murashko, a renowned Russian anthropologist with extensive experience advising the State Duma of the Russian Federation on indigenous peoples’ rights, discusses the practical challenges of implementing the “Standard of Responsibility…” in her work. She references a particular instance involving Gennady Shchukin, a deputy from the Taimyr district in the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Following the guidelines of the “Standard of Responsibility…”, Shchukin requested that authorities ensure the preliminary coordination of the Syradasai coal deposit development in Taimyr with indigenous peoples, and that these communities be allowed to review the results of environmental and ethnological assessments. The response from the Ministry of Regional Development starkly highlighted the limitations of the document: it clarified that “residents of the Arctic zone are not obliged to pre-coordinate an investment project with representatives of indigenous minorities and provide them with the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the results of environmental and ethnological expertise.”[44]

The irony in the Ministry of Regional Development’s response to Gennady Shchukin’s request is palpable, considering that this very ministry is the federal entity responsible for issuing the “Standard of Responsibility…” in the first place. Furthermore, it is tasked with “overseeing the adherence to this standard by Arctic zone residents”. [45]

The constraints of this article’s format preclude a detailed examination of the myriad documents related to the rights and socio-economic development of indigenous peoples that were adopted in anticipation of Russia’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council for 2021-2023. Notably, the “Program of state support for the traditional economic activities of indigenous Small peoples of the Russian Federation carried out in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” warrants its own analysis. This program, having evolved through several bureaucratic iterations within the Government of the Russian Federation, ultimately supplanted the federal target program “Economic and Social development of indigenous small peoples of the North” that had been operational in Arctic regions of Russia since 1996.

Overall, it’s evident that a significant aspect of these documents encompasses a promotional/propaganda element, hastily assembled prior to Russia’s Arctic Council presidency to demonstrate the government’s efforts towards safeguarding indigenous rights and fostering socio-economic progress.

A recurring theme among these documents is their practical unfeasibility within the existing legal framework of the Russian Federation, coupled with an absence of mechanisms to monitor and ensure their effective implementation.

It’s important to clarify that the focus here is not on the ethnocultural activities frequently sponsored by authorities—such as festivals, holidays, tourist conferences, and various biennials showcasing indigenous cultures—which Russia hosts in abundance annually. 

We are talking about the fundamental, in our opinion, foundations of the rights of indigenous peoples: the rights to lands and resources (or the priority use of such), the right to self-determination and self-government (the possibility of participation in decision-making), which eventually remained a set of good wishes of the Russian authorities to themselves and business and which, on the contrary, In our opinion, they cannot be implemented in Russia without a deep and structural transformation of land and resource legislation. 

The discussion centers on what the authors consider the fundamental aspects of indigenous peoples’ rights: access to and priority use of lands and resources, the right to self-determination and self-governance, including the capacity to participate in decision-making processes. These essential rights, however, have been reduced to a mere wishlist by the Russian authorities and business sectors, which, due to the current state of land and resource legislation, are arguably unattainable without significant and structural legal reforms in Russia.

The authors suggest that the failure to actualize indigenous peoples’ rights was not an unintended consequence but, rather, a deliberate objective of the Russian government in drafting these documents. The primary intention was to showcase to the Arctic Council Russia’s supposed dedication to indigenous issues, serving more as a propaganda effort than a genuine commitment to effecting change. In preparation for its presidency of the Arctic Council, the government purportedly mobilized substantial public resources to fuel a propaganda apparatus aimed at defending “Russian national interests in the Arctic.” This campaign attracted a wide array of participants, from professional PR specialists to various associations of indigenous peoples, including the national organization RAIPON, all positioned to support the state’s narrative in the Arctic discourse.

What is RAIPON?[46] 

This drive for self-organization gained significant momentum during the late Soviet period, particularly towards the end of Perestroika[47], as there was a resurgence of interest in preserving national cultures, languages, and ceremonial practices. It was within this context of cultural revival that the first formal organizations representing indigenous peoples in the northern regions of Russia began to emerge[48].

One landmark event in this journey was the First Congress of the Peoples of the North in March 1990, where the national organization “Association of the Peoples of the North of the USSR”[49] was established. This organization, which initially united 26 indigenous groups, was officially registered on November 24, 1993, as the “Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East” (RAIPON).

The historical development of RAIPON, reflecting its deep entanglement with Russia’s political shifts, is significant and multifaceted, requiring a nuanced exploration beyond the scope of this article. Its evolution is marked by several key phases:

1980s-1990s: Emergence of a Social Movement. This period saw the birth of the indigenous movement within the Soviet Union, spearheaded by figures from the national intelligentsia like Vladimir Sangi[50] and Yeremy Aipin[51], who consequently headed RAIPON. This era was characterized by a burgeoning interest in preserving and reviving indigenous cultures, languages, and traditions, setting the stage for more organized advocacy and representation.

1990-2004: Establishment of a National Association. The transition period following the Soviet Union’s collapse was marked by widespread economic turmoil that affected all Russians, with rampant inflation, poverty, and unemployment. For indigenous peoples, the impact was magnified due to the disintegration of the collective farm (kolkhoz) and state farm (sovkhoz) systems, which were vital for reindeer herding and fishing. This collapse led to significant losses in reindeer herds, exacerbating food insecurity and bringing about a severe crisis in the Northern Delivery[52] supply systems that remote indigenous communities were relying on. 

Despite these hardships, this era also ignited a period of revitalization and hope among indigenous communities. Faced with the failure of Soviet infrastructure and the dire necessity for sustenance, these communities turned back to their ancestral practices of hunting, fishing, and gathering. This resurgence of traditional ways of life not only helped them survive but also fostered a sense of cultural reawakening and unity among the indigenous populations.

This period led to the creation of national and regional legislation aimed at providing indigenous peoples with access to their ancestral lands and resources. It also sparked a movement among Russia’s indigenous communities to seek allies both within the country and internationally to support their rights and interests. This search for support helped foster connections with the broader global movement of indigenous peoples, enhancing efforts to promote their rights on both the domestic and international stages. RAIPON’s engagement with international bodies, including becoming a Permanent Member of the Arctic Council and initiating activities at the United Nations, signified a notable advancement in the global indigenous rights movement. 

Numerous federal laws have been enacted to form the foundation of national legislation aimed at safeguarding the rights of the North’s indigenous peoples[53]. The initial law, “On Guarantees of the rights of small indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation,” was enacted under Boris Yeltsin in 1999, followed by additional laws during the early years of Vladimir Putin’s administration. Among these, the Federal Law “On Fisheries and Conservation of Aquatic Biological Resources,” passed in 2004[54], stands out as it permitted indigenous communities to engage in traditional economic practices, effectively allowing them to operate small businesses within the fisheries sector.

2005 – 2013 is a period that can be characterized as a stage of increasing governmental pressure on the rights of indigenous peoples of the North. 

The so called “Law on the Monetization of Benefits” was enacted in 2005, aiming to overhaul the Soviet-era social security system by converting in-kind social benefits into cash payments. This reform, championed by the Putin administration, sparked widespread debate and dissatisfaction due to the replacement of existing benefits with cash payments that were often significantly lower and failed to account for inflation.

Despite its importance, the detailed and lengthy official title of this law[55] was not well communicated to the general populace, particularly affecting pensioners who stood against the withdrawal of their established benefits. Moreover, less known is the fact that this legislation brought substantial amendments to the legal framework concerning indigenous peoples, removing many provisions designed to safeguard their rights, thereby deteriorating their legal protections.

While a thorough examination of the amendments and their effects on indigenous communities warrants a dedicated discussion, a notable example of the legislative changes includes the removal of an article from the Federal Law “On Guarantees…” This article previously established quotas for the representation of indigenous minorities in both the legislative assemblies of Russian federal subjects and local self-governing bodies, highlighting a significant shift in the legal landscape for indigenous rights[56].

The Association, alongside various indigenous public and political groups, vigorously opposed the legislative changes, proposing alternatives to the government and the State Duma. However, their efforts were overshadowed by the widespread dissatisfaction with the “monetization of benefits” policy, which led to extensive public protests[57]. The government’s response to these protests was notably cautious, and the controversial decisions remained unchanged.

Subsequently, under Vladimir Putin’s administration in 2008, the government enacted numerous amendments to federal laws, adversely affecting indigenous peoples’ rights. Notably, changes were made to laws governing hunting, fishing, and land use, including the introduction of auctions for fishing and hunting territories. This new approach resulted in indigenous communities losing access to their ancestral lands as these areas were acquired by commercial entities through the auction process[58] .

This period of legislative and policy shifts concluded with significant political changes in 2011 when Putin reassumed the presidency. Around the same time, the indigenous movement witnessed a leadership transition with the election of Grigory Ledkov, a deputy of the State Duma representing the United Russia party, as its new leader in 2013. This change marked a new chapter in the advocacy and representation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the North.

2013 – to the present. This phase is marked by an escalation in authoritarian practices within Russia’s governance, characterized by severe encroachments on citizens’ rights and freedoms, transitioning Putin’s regime towards outright dictatorship. Notably, this period saw the enactment of controversial laws targeting “foreign agents” and “undesirable organizations,” leading to the widespread shutdown or forced departure of numerous NGOs, both Russian and international, as well as independent media outlets. This era also witnessed increased repression, including the persecution and elimination of political adversaries to Vladimir Putin. A significant culmination of these tendencies was the military aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, events that have been extensively documented in both journalistic and academic circles.

This anti-democratic shift towards authoritarianism can be traced back to 2012, following Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency and the return of his predecessor, signaling the onset of a more repressive state apparatus. Indications of this growing trend were observable as early as 2008 when Putin reentered the government, seemingly laying the groundwork for his return to the presidency. During this preparatory phase, there was a noticeable increase in involvement from officials within the Presidential administration, law enforcement, and the FSB[59] in the activities of indigenous peoples’ movements. For the first time, these government representatives took an active role in events related to indigenous peoples and began to exert influence over the internal proceedings and documentation of indigenous organizations, signaling an early stage of the government’s tightening grip on civil society and minority rights advocacy groups.

Shortly after Vladimir Putin reassumed the presidency in 2012, the Russian Ministry of Justice sought to dissolve RAIPON as a public entity[60]. By early 2013, through a series of coercive tactics and influence over the 7th Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East, the authorities used all kinds of manipulative methods to secure the presidency of RAIPON for Grigory Ledkov, a relatively unknown figure at the time and a deputy of the State Duma from the United Russia party[61].

The transformation of RAIPON under Ledkov’s leadership warrants a detailed examination. Initially committed to advocating for the rights and self-governance of indigenous peoples in line with international standards[62], the organization shifted its stance, endorsing amendments to what is referred to as “Putin’s” Constitution[63]. These amendments effectively broadened the president’s powers, a move considered detrimental to the legal standing and rights of indigenous peoples in Russia[64]. Moreover, the focus on “self-government” as a primary goal of RAIPON diminished under Ledkov’s tenure[65]. The organization’s new direction also included reporting disloyal members to law enforcement[66].

Restrictions on the involvement of RAIPON’s general membership and indigenous community representatives critical of the government led to their exclusion from participating in meetings[67] and international forums[68]. This shift meant that RAIPON’s statements at global events started echoing the official narratives of the Russian government, frequently acknowledging the state’s support for indigenous peoples and promoting protection and implementation of their rights[69]. 

This reorientation of RAIPON culminated in its backing of President Putin’s criminal military actions in Ukraine[70], which contravenes the fundamental rights of Ukraine’s indigenous peoples, including their rights to life, security, self-determination, and the preservation of their lands, cultures, and languages. 

Revisiting the core focus of this article, which examines RAIPON’s role in advancing Russia’s Arctic policies, it’s evident that the organization has significantly evolved over a span of more than three decades. Initially formed as an independent advocate for the rights of indigenous communities in the North, Siberia, and the Far East, RAIPON has gradually been co-opted by governmental influences, adapting to shifts in legislation and broader geopolitical strategies. This evolution mirrors the broader transition of the Russian state itself, moving from a period of democratic openness to dictatorship.

The rights of indigenous peoples as an instrument of Russia’s International Propaganda in the Arctic

It’s worth noting that the Association of Indigenous Peoples wasn’t the sole component of the Kremlin’s PR apparatus during Russia’s presidency of the Arctic Council from 2021 to 2023. In the lead-up to this event, numerous propaganda organizations and media outlets were established in Russia, focusing on Arctic issues or the indigenous peoples of the North, including but not limited to:

This list of examples is by far not exhaustive. The PR campaign backing Russia’s second presidency of the Arctic Council, orchestrated or endorsed by the Kremlin, constitutes a political phenomenon that will likely need a separate analysis by independent researchers. In a cursory overview, it’s challenging to fully grasp the true objectives behind the establishment of such organizations, along with the intricacies and interconnections among their numerous organizers and stakeholders. It’s noteworthy that the same individuals often served as the founders of certain organizations while acting as experts in others. 

The fact that leaders of these organizations often ascended to prominent positions in political, economic, or public spheres at both regional and federal levels underscores the significance of this endeavor for quasi-governmental groups during the preparation for Russia’s presidency in the Arctic Council. For instance, Sergey Sizonenko, formerly a deputy of the Taimyr Dolgan-Nenets district (now a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of the Krasnoyarsk Territory), assumed leadership of KMNSoyuz. Vasily Borisov, the former deputy editor-in-chief of the largest Russian news agency RIA-NOVOSTI, took on the role of editor-in-chief at Barents News agency.  The Deputy Director General for the Development of Offshore Projects at Gazprom Neft Andrey Patrushev (the son of the former Secretary of the Russian Security Council and the brother of the Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation), became a director of the autonomous non-profit organization Arctic Initiatives Center.[71]

Those familiar with the intricate behind-the-scenes of Russian politics will recognize the remarkable shift in Andrei Patrushev’s career trajectory, transitioning from a position of leadership within one of Russia’s largest oil companies to heading a non-profit organization focused on promoting the linguistic heritage of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic.[72]

In general, there are several common characteristics shared by the aforementioned organizations. Firstly, all of them, to varying degrees, were involved in disseminating information about the substantial accomplishments of the Russian government in safeguarding the Arctic, its environment, the indigenous peoples inhabiting it, and their cultural heritage. Hundreds of presentations[73], conferences[74], publications[75], websites[76] and other propaganda resources have been devoted to this good cause. 

In general, this stream of commendation can be encapsulated in the words of the Minister for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, Alexei Chekunkov, during the launch ceremony of the information and educational portal “Children of the Arctic” in August 2021: “The global community is closely observing the Arctic today… With nearly 6,000 languages spoken worldwide, many are at risk… Among our efforts is the preservation of this heritage, these treasures for future generations…, aiming to underscore once more the vast wealth and diversity of the Russian Arctic.”[77]

Secondly, Russian propaganda has indeed focused extensively on environmental issues and infringements upon the rights of indigenous peoples in other Arctic Council countries. For instance, The Barents News PR agency highlighted that the coastal regions of Alaska have been transformed into dumping grounds for the entire Arctic, asserting that “the Russian Arctic seas are becoming ‘landfills’ for the countries of Western Europe and the United States.”[78] Furthermore, the Russian Embassy in Norway has compiled a distinct report on the infringement of Sami rights within that nation.[79]

One of the most intriguing events that intertwines both trends occurred with the publication of the “Polar Index of the Barents Region” by PORA in the summer of 2020.[80] Conceived to showcase the accomplishments of Russian Arctic regions and companies in sustainable development on one hand, while also shedding light on environmental issues faced by neighboring countries in the Barents region, this rating included three Russian companies in the top five. Notably, the top spot was claimed by Russian Rosneft, known to the authors of this publication as one of the most environmentally damaging oil companies in Russia. [81] In an ironic twist, the fourth position was secured by Norilsk Nickel, which shortly before the rating’s publication was responsible for one of the largest man-made disasters in Arctic history – the release of 20 thousand tons of diesel fuel in Norilsk in May 2020.[82]  

Another significant theme for Russian propaganda in the Arctic was the targeting of indigenous people who publicly spoke out against violations of their rights in the region and openly criticized authorities and businesses for such transgressions.  To undermine their credibility, propagandists often branded these activists as anti-Russian rhetoric[83] and separatism.[84]  

The authors of this article attempted to tally the number of publications on the Russian Internet dedicated to this topic, but ultimately abandoned the endeavor due to the sheer volume of content available. Organizations such as the Federal News Agency Regnum [85], the Information and Analytical Agency Barents News,[86] as well as structures associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin[87], notably the later widely known troll factory[88]engaged in manipulating public opinion in Russia and abroad, devoted particular focus to such publications.

Sami (and previously Pomor) [89]activists, including Andrei Danilov, Alexander Slupachik and others, received especially a lot of criticism from various kinds of propagandists. Some of them were subsequently forced to emigrate from Russia.[90]

The authors conducted interviews with some of these coerced emigrants, details of which cannot be disclosed in this article. They believe that this activity was largely conducted with the approval and coordination of representatives of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation[91]. These representatives artificially linked public criticism of violations of the rights of indigenous peoples with so-called threats to national security of the Russian Federation.

This sentiment is further echoed by the stance of Nikolai Patrushev, the ex-Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (former director of the FSB of the Russian Federation and the father of the abovementioned head of the Arctic Initiatives Center Andrey Patrushev), who, at a meeting on national security issues in May 2021, asserted that “the intensification of interethnic tensions, the spread of xenophobia and extremism is influenced by the promotion by foreign non-governmental organizations of pro-Western liberal values, separatist sentiments, various kinds of false information, including the alleged infringement of the rights of indigenous minorities” (in the Murmansk region).[92]

However, the most prominent role in promoting the Russian presidency of the Arctic Council (2021-2023) was arguably assigned to the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation (Raipon), recognized as the organization “representing the interests” of the indigenous peoples of the North.

As previously mentioned, by 2021, Raipon had transformed into an organization entirely controlled by the Russian government. By this time, with the approval and support of the authorities, the Association had already engaged in collaborations with major Russian mining companies, which financed its operations[93]through a charitable foundation specifically established for this purpose to support the indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East[94]. In exchange for funding, the Association participated in the public relations efforts of these companies[95] and promoted their interests internationally.[96]

It is noteworthy that the largest Russian mining company, Norilsk Nickel, which operates in the territories of indigenous peoples in Taimyr, the Murmansk Region, and the Trans-Baikal Territory, gradually began to play a significant role in financing Raipon[97]. In our view, the environmental disaster in Norilsk in 2020, as mentioned earlier, played a pivotal role in increasing such funding. As a result, Raipon, Norilsk Nickel, and the Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs have entered into cooperation agreements[98], under which PR projects are currently being implemented to promote both the company[99] and state policies towards indigenous peoples in Russia.[100]. 

According to Nikolai Korchunov, Ambassador-at-Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Arctic Council from Russia, Russia organized 30 events[101] on indigenous issues within the framework of its chairmanship in the Arctic Council, with Raipon involved to varying degrees in each. However, according to the authors’ calculations, many more such events were likely held if we account for the preparatory period (which began several years before formally assuming the presidency) and events organized by various scientific organizations, PR agencies, and other government entities.

Some of them were frankly “festival” in nature, for example, the “International Reindeer Herding Championship”, [102] others suggested some discussion. 

However, at none of these events did representatives of Raipon express any significant criticism of Russian government decisions or the actions of mining companies that violate the rights of indigenous peoples. Instead, they emphasized the existence of such violations in other countries of the Arctic Council[103], while highlighting the positive role of Russian authorities and businesses in preserving the culture of indigenous peoples in Russia[104].

Returning to the order of the Ministry of Regional Development of Russia dated November 23, 2020, No. 181, “On approval of the standard of responsibility for residents of the Arctic zone,” which we discussed earlier and which, in our view, serves as little more than a symbolic gesture in the Kremlin’s grandiose PR campaign orchestrated for Russia’s presidency of the Arctic Council, we would like to present its description in the words of Raipon President and Senator Grigory Ledkov, as he often articulates it at various events: “…on the standards of responsibility of residents of the Arctic zone. When they start working in the Arctic territories, and, of course, this is a revolutionary event for Russia, it is very new. These standards work everywhere abroad, all over the world and in the Arctic, and today these standards will be applied in our Arctic. Of course, there are such positive aspects in that it is the degree of responsibility, accountability, openness, interaction with the local population, including with indigenous people.”[105]

Conclusion  

In this article, we intentionally focused on propaganda and the utilization of indigenous agents for this purpose, omitting other significant aspects of the current state of indigenous peoples in the Russian Arctic, such as the impact of the war with Ukraine, forced mobilization of indigenous representatives into the army, rupture of relations with the West, and interruption of partnerships and family ties among related peoples living in different countries, including the Sami, Aleut, and Inuit, among many others.

While we have touched upon these topics previously and plan to delve deeper in future publications, our aim here was to shed light on the falsification of the real situation of indigenous peoples in Russia and the exploitation of indigenous representatives themselves for propaganda purposes. However, even to fully elucidate the extent of Raipon’s and other Russian agents’ involvement in propaganda, such as KNMSOYUZ or Barents News, one article is insufficient. A comprehensive study is needed.

Traces of such propaganda, along with generous sponsorship from Russian mining companies, particularly Norilsk Nickel, can be found in UN documents[106], where Russian government lobbyists like Alexey Tsykarev (formerly an expert at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues) and Antonina Gorbunova (a member of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) have been actively engaged.

Regrettably, representatives of the international community often fall prey to the Russian propaganda machine. For instance, prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, indigenous peoples from other Arctic countries frequently participated in numerous Russian events dedicated to the Arctic and indigenous peoples. During one of these events, Russian PR specialists misrepresented the words of Silje Karine Muotka, chairperson of the Sami Parliament of Norway. They distorted her statement and used it in fake news regarding Russian Sami.[107] Subsequently, Silje Karine Muotka, upon grasping the intricacies of the scandal, provided a separate interview on the matter. Regrettably, it was solely for Norwegian audiences, in Norwegian, and accessible only through subscription-based media outlets. [108]

Russia’s tenure as chair of the Arctic Council has concluded, and many of the aforementioned PR organizations have fallen into disrepute as soon as the authorities ceased allocating the necessary funding. Some websites were closed down,[109] some have stopped updating.[110] The previously mentioned son of the ex-Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Andrei Patrushev, has transitioned to another position.[111]

However, the Kremlin’s propaganda machine itself has not dissipated. It persists in its operations both within Russia and internationally. There are already voices from Russian officials and their proxies[112] asserting that reducing contacts within the Arctic Council framework between Russia and other countries primarily harms indigenous peoples. Through our article, we aimed to demonstrate that these voices do not represent the genuine concerns of indigenous peoples, who currently lack the freedom to openly address their issues and rights violations in Russia due to fear of persecution by the authorities and law enforcement.[113]

These are the voices of Russian propaganda, the voice of the Kremlin, whose goal is only to strengthen its own power.  

Russian version

[1] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 645 dated 10/26/2020 “On the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security Until 2035″ – http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/economic/Arctic_stratery / (access: 03/01/2024) 

[2] Comment by Yuri Trutnev, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District of Russia on Vladimir Putin’s signing the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security Until 2035” – https://forumarctica.ru/news/prinyata-strategiya-razvitiya-arkticheskoy-zony-rossii-do-2035-goda / (access:  03/01/2024) 

[3] Russia’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021-2023. RosCongress, Higher School of Economics, Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, 2023 – https://as.arctic-russia.ru/analytics/itog-doklad-2023-09-07-ru.pdf (access: 03/10/2024)

[4] The Arctic in the Focus of Modern Geopolitics – https://www.arcticandnorth.ru/Encyclopedia_Arctic/arctic_focus.pdf (access – 03/01/2024)  

[5] Russian Arctic – https://erdc.ru/about-azrf / (access: 03/01/2024) 

[6] The Ministry of Eastern Development was renamed the Ministry for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic – https://tass.ru/politika/6161204 (access: 03/10/2024)

[7] Federal Law of July 20, 2000 No. 104-FZ “On the General Principles of the Organization of Communities of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation” – https://base .garant.ru/182356/ (access: 10.03.2024)

[8] One of the romanticized names of Russia’s colonization of the territory of Siberia and the Far East in the 1500s-1700s. V. A. Turaev’s “Walking to Meet the Sun” in the context of the problems of the annexation of the Far East to the Russian State (1600-1900) – https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/hozhdenie-vstrech-solntsu-v-kontekste-problem-prisoedineniya-dalnego-vostoka-k-rossiyskomu-gosudarstvu-hvii-hviii-vv (access: 03/10/2024)

[9] Steller G.V., Description of the Land of Kamchatka / Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky: Holding company “New Book”, 2011, 576 p.

[10] Arzhanova Y.S. “The Kazym Riot: Causes and Consequences” – https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=50178168 (access: 03/10/2024)

[11] Asochakova V.N., Chistanova S.V., Missionary Activity as a Factor in the Development of Siberia in the XVII–XIX centuries. – https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/missionerskaya-deyatelnost-kak-faktor-osvoeniya-sibiri-v-xvii-xix-vv.pdf (access: 03/10/2024) 

[12] The Charter on the Management of Foreigners, dated July 22, 1822. The Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire since 1849 Vol. 38. No. 29. 120 pp. 394-416 

[13] Bernal Diaz del Castillo, “The True Story of the Conquest of New Spain” (1557-1575), Forum, 2000, 404 p.  

[14] S.M. Solovyov. The History of Russia Since Ancient Times. Volume six, chapter VII. The Stroganovs and Ermak

[15]  Lyapunova R.G. Ethnocultural contacts of Russians with the Aleuts and Pacific Eskimos in the XVIII—XIX centuries. // Problems of Indian Studies. America After Columbus: The Interaction of the Two Worlds / ed. by V.A. Tishkov. Moscow: Nauka, 1992. Pp. 73-85.

[16] The term coined by the Soviet and Russian writer Chingiz Aitmatov and described in his novel “And a Day lasts longer than a Century”, which denoted a prisoner turned into a soulless slave creature, completely subordinate to the master and not remembering anything from a previous life

[17] Northern allowances: history and modernity https://arctic-russia.ru/article/severnye-nadbavki-istoriya-i-sovremennost -/ (access 03/01/2024)

[18] Andrey Smirnov. The population of the World Arctic: population dynamics and settlement centers – https://www.arcticandnorth.ru/upload/iblock/ffc/270_290.pdf (access 03/01/2024)

[19] Olga Tynyanova. Arctic context of territorial security: Russia’s subarctic regions in the new geopolitical reality. – https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/arkticheskiy-kontekst-territorialnoy-bezopasnosti-priarkticheskie-regiony-rossii-v-novoy-geopoliticheskoy-realnosti (access 01.03.2024)

[20] The highest degree of distinction awarded to several cities of the Soviet Union, famous for their defense during World War II

[21] The position of the head of the Soviet state

[22] Shekh Alexander Gorbachev’s visits to the regions against the background of socio-economic processes (on the example of the Murmansk and Sverdlovsk regions) – https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vizity-m-s-gorbacheva-v-regiony-na-fone-sotsialno-ekonomicheskih-protsessov-na-primere-murmanskoy-i-sverdlovskoy-oblastey (access 03/01/2024)

[23] Valery Zhuravel. The Arctic Council: the main milestones of development (for the 25th anniversary of education) – https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/arkticheskiy-sovet-osnovnye-vehi-razvitiya-k-25-letiyu-obrazovaniya (access 03/01/2024) 

[24] Ibid.

[25] Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries [Convention 169] – https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/iol169.shtml (access 03/01/2024)

[26] United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/indigenous_rights.shtml (access 03/01/2024)

[27] Pavel Sulyandziga. The policy of paternalism was anathematized in words, but in fact it became even more terry (speech at the ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council (Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998) – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/706(access 03/01/2024)

[28] Arthur Chilingarov: The Arctic is a territory of Russia, and it is our home – http://duma.gov.ru/news/55287/ (access 01.03.2024)

[29] V.I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, has passed away – https://mgimo.ru/about/news/main/churkin / (access 03/01/2024)

[30] The Arctic: a development strategy, monograph / edited by S.A. Lipina, O.O. Smirnova, E.V. Kudryashova; Sev. (Arctic) feder. M.V. Univ. Lomonosov.  Arkhangelsk: SAFU, 2019. – 338 p.

[31] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated September 18, 2008 N Pr-1969 “On the Fundamentals of Russia’s State policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond” – http://government.ru/info/18359 / (access 03/01/2024)

[32] In the same place 

[33] It is necessary to make a reservation that the authors of the article did not take into account in this list other areas of state policy that should potentially benefit all residents of the Arctic, such as nature protection, development of the transport system, science, information technology, and so on 

[34] See the list in a separate appendix

[35] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 08.02.2013 “On approval of the “Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period up to 2020” – https://base .garant.ru/71796486/#friends (access 01.03.2024)

[36] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 03/05/2020 No. 164 “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2035” (with amendments and additions) – http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45255 (access 03/01/2024)

[37] Order of the Ministry of Regional Development of Russia dated 11/23/2020 No. 181 “On approval of the standard of responsibility of residents of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in relations with indigenous small peoples of the Russian Federation Living and (or) carrying out traditional economic activities in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” – https://rulaws.ru/acts/Prikaz-Minvostokrazvitiya-Rossii-ot-23.11.2020-N-181 / (access 03/01/2024)

[38] The Pechora Rescue Committee believes that LUKOIL-Komi hid another accident – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/10203 (access 03/01/2024)

[39] iRussia Archive: The criminal Case of Gennady Shchukin (2015-2019) – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/18082 (access 03/01/2024)

[40] iRussia Archive: Agreements – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/tag/соглашение (access 03/01/2024)

[41] iRussia Archive: Ethnological Expertise – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/tag/этнологическая-экспертиза (access 03/01/2024)

[42] The Law of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) of April 14, 2010 820-Z N 537-IV “On ethnological expertise in places of traditional residence and traditional economic activity and in the territories of traditional nature management of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)” – https://docs.cntd.ru/document/895252453 (access 03/01/2024)

[43] The territory of identical law: legal contradictions — an obstacle to development – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/36640 – (access 03/01/2024)

[44] Murashko O.A. Innovations of the federal legislation of 2020-2021 in the field of the rights of indigenous minorities and their impact on the lives of indigenous minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East on the example of the Sami of the Murmansk Region – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/11899 (access 03/01/2024)

[45] Federal Law of July 13, 2020 No. 193-FZ “On State support for entrepreneurial activity in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” – https://rulaws.ru/acts/Prikaz-Minvostokrazvitiya-Rossii-ot-23.11.2020-N-181 / (access 03/01/2024)

[46] Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East. Many people, especially abroad, know this organization under the name RAIPON. This abbreviation of the name in English is the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. Further in the text, the terms Raipon and Association will be used as equivalent – https://raipon.info (access – 03/10/2024) 

[47] The Great Russian Encyclopedia 2004-2017. Perestroika https://old.bigenc.ru/domestic_history/text/2330846 (access – 03/10/2024) 

[48] The anniversary of the oldest association of indigenous peoples in the country will be celebrated with a dog sled race in Kamchatka – https://www.kamgov.ru/slcult/news/ubilej-starejsej-associacii-korennyh-narodov-v-strane-otmetat-gonkoj-na-sobacih-uprazkah-na-kamcatke-69579 (access – 03/10/2024) 

[49] Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation. General information – https://raipon.info/association/index (access – 03/10/2024)

[50] Sangi Vladimir Mikhailovich – https://raipon.info/press-tsentr/personalii/sangi-vladimir-mikhaylovich /

(access – 10.03.2024) 

[51] Aipin Yeremey Danilovich – https://raipon.info/press-tsentr/personalii/aypin-eremey-danilovich /

(access – 10.03.2024) 

[52] What is the “northern delivery” and why was it disrupted this year? – https://aif.ru/dontknows/eternal/1015079 (access – 10.03.2024) 

[53] First of all, these are federal laws “On guarantees of the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the Russian Federation” dated 30.04.1999 No. 82-FZ; “On General principles of organizing communities of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation” dated 07/20/2000 No. 104-FZ and “On territories of traditional nature use of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation”. Far East of the Russian Federation” dated May 7, 2001 N 49-FZ – Ekaterina Zmyvalova, Human Rights of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples in Russia: Recent Developments – https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/2336/4826 (access – 03/10/2024) 

[54] Federal Law “On Fisheries and Conservation of Aquatic Biological Resources” dated 12/20/2004 No. 166-FZ – https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_50799 / (access – 03/10/2024)

[55] Its full name is the Federal Law “On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and Invalidation of Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with the Adoption of Federal Laws “On Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law “On General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation” and “On general principles of the organization of local self-government in the Russian Federation” dated 08/22/2004 N 122-FZ – https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_49025 / (access – 03/10/2024)

[56] “The Law on the Monetization of Benefits”, article 119 – https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_49025/fbffc01ec72358b183d76c8333d13f73bb65d4fb / (access – 03/10/2024)

[57] For example, at one of these actions, its participants burned an effigy of Putin – “The beneficiaries burned Putin” – https://www.gazeta.ru/2005/02/28/oa_149600.shtml (access – 03/10/2024) 

[58] The report of the President of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East, S.N. Kharyuchi. To the VI Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East. The world of indigenous peoples. The Living Arctic. No.22, 2009 pp. 4-19 – https://www.csipn.ru/images/stories/publications/Mir_k_n/issue_22.pdf (access – 03/10/2024)

[59] The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation – http://www.fsb.ru / (access – 03/10/2024)

[60] Dmitry Berezhkov. The Russian Government shuts down the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) – https://www.iwgia.org/images/newsarchivefiles/0710_Background_article_RAIPON.pdf (access – 10.03.2024)

[61] Thomas Nilsen, Moscow staged RAIPON election thriller | Barentsobserver – https://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2013/04/moscow-staged-raipon-election-thriller-03-04 (access – 10.03.2024)

[62] Sergey Haryuchi. The results of the decade are the basis for development in the 21st century. The world of indigenous peoples. The living Arctic. No.3, 2000 pp. 7-12 

[63] State Duma deputy Ledkov: “Amendments to the Constitution guarantee the support of the peoples of the North” – https://www.mk-yamal.ru/politics/2020/03/19/deputat-gosdumy-ledkov-popravki-v-konstituciyu-garantiruyut-podderzhku-narodov-severa.html (access – 03/10/2024) 

[64] Dmitry Berezhkov, Pavel Sulyandziga. Article 69 of the Constitution is a new reality for the indigenous peoples of Russia – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/1834 (access – 03/10/2024)

[65] The Charter of the All-Russian Public Organization “Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation” with amendments and additions made by the VIII Congress on March 24, 2017 – https://raipon.info/upload/iblock/bdf/bdf22fcd009457440e585ba26ee431d3.pdf (access – 03/10/2024)

[66] Mark Zdorov: “I was threatened with arrest at RAIPON” – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/32073 (access – 03/10/2024) / Reindeer herder faces a fine for a rally in the tundra – https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3946881 (access – 03/10/2024)

[67] “We must defend our interests ourselves” – https://nemoskva.net/2024/03/04/my-dolzhny-sami-otstaivat-svoi-interesy / (access – 03/10/2024) / 

[68] The UN experts were hidden from the aborigines – https://ura.news/articles/1036270507 (access – 03/10/2024)

[69] Kamchatka took part in the work of the Expert Mechanism for the first time

on the rights of indigenous peoples in Geneva – 

https://indigenous-russia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Aborigen-Kamchatki-2023.02.276.pdf   (access – 15.03.2024)

[70] The Association of the CMNSS and the Far East of the Russian Federation supported the President V.V. Putin’s – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/19416 (access – 03/10/2024)

[71] Andrey Patrushev assumed leadership of the Arctic Initiatives Center – https://www.rbc.ru/business/27/11/2019/5dde46379a79472d082f60d2 (access – 03/10/2024)

[72] Which of the characters photographed below is the “child of the Arctic”? – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/22591 (access – 03/10/2024)

[73] The Interfax News Agency. The tag “Arctic” – https://www.interfax-russia.ru/tag/673 (access – 03/31/2024)

[74] International Forum “Public-Private Partnership in the field of sustainable development of indigenous peoples” – https://as.arctic-russia.ru/multimedia/broadcast/mezhdunarodnyy-forum-gosudarstvenno-chastnoe-partnyerstvo-v-sfere-ustoychivogo-razvitiya-korennykh/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[75] RIA Novosti. The Arctic Council – https://ria.ru/organization_Arkticheskijj_sovet/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[76] GoArctic Portal – https://goarctic.ru/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[77] The information and educational portal “Children of the Arctic” has been officially launched – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/14741 (access – 03/10/2024)

[78] The spread of plastic debris and toxic pollution poses threats to the health and livelihood opportunities of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/26195 (access – 03/10/2024)

[79] Russian Embassy in Norway “On the Situation Around Violation of the Rights of Indigenous Peoplesin the Nordic Countries – a background paper” https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02ngqbMJmY4FUpioGjFAsWguZFG6GJ8HJUxccSjAJevUZpJ9thyZd8BjKQNM7n36Hzl&id=100070825705691#_=_(access – 03/10/2024)

[80] THE POLAR INDEX OF THE BARENTS REGION – https://indigenous-russia.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Рейтинги-Баренц-РУ-2020-_R2-1.pdf (access – 03/10/2024)

[81] “Have you tried fishing in the cemetery?” Dozens of tons of oil poured into the Amur River – https://www.sibreal.org/a/30798593.html ?fbclid=IwAR1-baM6VSh01u40t1ZjuE69NlTAqRzGFdB2mZbUrU5dRUThNKI0ZnmkFNw(access – 03/10/2024)

[82] Still cleaning up after one of the biggest ever Arctic spills – https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/node/10444 (access – 03/10/2024)

[83] The Norwegian authorities intend to actively work to oust Russia from the Arctic – https://51rus.org/news/policy/28874.html(access – 03/10/2024)

[84] Head of the POMOR Center Timofey Surovtsev: neighbors are fueling separatism among the peoples inhabiting the Russian North – https://kgzt.ru/korol-norvegii-nagradil-saamov-no-te-nazvali-eto-laquo-sladkoj-piljulej-raquo-iz-za-prodolzhajushhihsya-narushenij-prav-cheloveka (access – 03/10/2024)

[85] Regnum*. Scandinavians accused Russia of putting pressure on indigenous peoples – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/26933 (access – 03/10/2024)

[86] The words of the President of the Sami Parliament were falsified by Russian propaganda: I think it is extremely unpleasant – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/26889 (access – 03/10/2024)

[87] Denunciation of indigenous people. Russian Sami are again accused of separatism – https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/06/12/85820-donos-na-korennyh (access – 03/10/2024)

[88] Financing propaganda. The creation of a “troll factory” and the persecution of journalists – https://dossier.center/e-prigozhin/article/finansirovanie-propagandy/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[89] And earlier, the Pomeranian activist Ivan Moseev was subjected to similar harassment – https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/11/12_a_4849621.shtml?updated (access – 03/10/2024)

[90] “I just want to help my people,” says exiled Sámi leader – https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/indigenous-peoples/2023/02/i-just-want-help-my-people-says-exiled-sami-leader (access – 03/10/2024)

[91] The FSB of Russia – http://www.fsb.ru (access – 03/10/2024)

[92] Patrushev pointed to the growth of extremism in the Northwestern Federal District – https://tass.ru/politika/11356697 (access – 03/10/2024)

[93] Elena Bezdenezhnykh: Big business can play an important role in supporting the KMNS – https://24rus.ru/more.php?UID=147319 (access – 03/10/2024)

[94] Resolution No. 5 of the Coordinating Council of the ACMNSS and the Far East of the Russian Federation dated February 8, 2018. “On the formation of the bodies of the Charitable Foundation for the Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East” – https://indigenous-russia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2018.02.08-Решение-КС-Райпон-.pdf (access – 03/10/2024)

[95] Norilsk Nickel enhances the potential of indigenous peoples – https://www.kp.ru/daily/27524/4788615/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[96] The letter of the RAIPON to the International Maritime Organization – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/32867 (access – 03/10/2024)

[97] Norilsk Nickel. Contribution to the development of the regions – https://csr2020.nornickel.ru/ru/contribution/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[98] An agreement was signed on a comprehensive plan to promote the development of indigenous small peoples of the North – for a total amount of 2 billion rubles – https://dela.ru/news/261630/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[99] Free, prior and informed consent (SPOS) in Tukhard – https://fpic.kmnsoyuz.ru (access – 03/10/2024) 

[100] The All-Russian competitive educational program “Indigenous peoples of Russia. School of Public Diplomacy” – https://school-kmn-rf.ru (access – 03/10/2024)

[101] Russia has held 30 events on indigenous issues within the framework of the AU Presidency – https://tass.ru/obschestvo/17280221 (access – 03/10/2024)

[102] The International Reindeer Husbandry Championship. Interesting moments and results of the competition – https://ulus.media/2023/03/19/mezhdunarodnyj-chempionat-po-olenevodstvu-interesnye-momenty-i-itogi-sorevnovaniy/

[103] Grigory Ledkov: “Thanks to the joint work, the indigenous peoples managed to preserve their way of life” – https://ugra-news.ru/article/grigoriy_ledkov_blagodarya_sovmestnoy_rabote_korennym_narodam_udalos_sokhranit_svoy_uklad/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[104] Broadcast of the International Forum “Public-Private Partnership in the field of sustainable development of indigenous peoples” – https://forum-moscow2023.ru/forum-moscow-broadcast.html (access – 03/10/2024) 

[105] The standard of responsibility for residents of the Arctic zone begins to operate on the territory of Russia – https://salehard .bezformata.com/listnews/otvetstvennosti-rezidentov-arkticheskoy/92067453/ (access – 03/10/2024)  

[106] E/C.19/2023/6 Implementing Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Context of Indigenous Peoples by Alexey Tsykarev – https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.19%2F2023%2F6&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False (access – 10.03.2024)

[107] The only country in the Arctic where the Sami can have a future is Russia – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/26113(access – 03/10/2024)

[108] The words of the President of the Sami Parliament were falsified by Russian propaganda: I think it is extremely unpleasant – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/26889 (access – 03/10/2024)

[109] Information and analytical agency “Barents News” – https://barents-news.com/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[110] National Association of Specialized Journalists “ECO-press” – http://www.eco-pressa.ru/news (access – 03/10/2024)

[111] Nikolai Patrushev’s youngest son left the post of head of the Arctic Initiatives Center, through which he owned shares in companies in the oil and gas sector in the Arctic – https://istories.media/news/2024/02/14/mladshii-sin-nikolaya-patrusheva-pokinul-post-glavi-tsentra-arkticheskie-initsiativi-cherez-kotorii-on-vladel-dolyami-v-kompaniyakh-neftegazovogo-sektora-v-arktike/ (access – 03/10/2024)

[112] A/HRC/54/52: Impact of militarization on the rights of Indigenous Peoples – Study by the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/studies/ahrc5452-impact-militarization-rights-indigenous-peoples-study-expert-mechanism (access – 10.03.2024)

[113] Russia of indigenous peoples. The tag “Criminalization of leaders” – https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/tag/криминализация-лидеров (access – 03/10/2024)

Exit mobile version